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This report to the National Aeronautice aDd space Adminietration i e  
designed to eerve ae background for a syetematlc study t o  be undertaken 
under the auspices of the HASA. The objective of t h i s  latter study i e  the 
construction of a rationale or policy-pl- basla for a national space 
The broad problem to  be considered is, in the vords af the 
Adminiatrator of M A :  
"To identlfy national objectives t o  be served by a 
program of non-military space activities, to  suggest 
the magnitude and scope of the -am required to 
attain those obJectives, and to  determine the balance 
of emphasie to be placed on various p-es of the pro- 
gram I n  both the short and long term future." 
Frau a memorandum by T. Keith Olennan, 
Jbne 19, 1959, "On the Reed for a Btudy 
To Develop a Supportable Position on 
Rate and Scale In Space Research." 
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k mmoNAL aBJEcI?vEs 
‘phe ~ ~ ~ t W  SPELCS Pr0Q;ram of he United States $8 predicated on 
five objectives: 
1. lb galn atature for the nation In  the general struggle with world 
ComntmiSm. 
2, To contribute relevaat technical kuuwledge and eervlces t o  the 
national defenee effort, 
3. To advance science and technology generelly, 
4, Ipo develop apace system for public welfare and ccmnnercial appli- 
cations 
To cooperate vith other nations in the use of space systems for 
peaceiul purposes, 
5. 
/ 
Them obJectivee in many rays are mutually supporting, 
BIZE AND SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM 
To determine the dimensions of a eatable non-milltary program requlree 
first an appraisal of the entire national space effort, including of course 
the olilitary missile and space program, Moreover, it requhee an appreciation 
of the way i n  vhich space activities, military and non-mllitary, are related. 
Tbe feature that gives unlty t o  all space activities, despite their diverse 
objectives, is the fact  that they all rely won a camon technology and, 
frequently, ugon identical equipments and facilities. 
must be recognized when physical requirements for either trpe of activity 
are considered, 
This Interdependence 
7-22-59 
The emphasis that should be placed on various phases of the program, in 
both the near and distant future, must grw out of an appraisal of our exlet- 
ing and potential capacities for space activities, and a r&xamination of our 
national mottves. 
A RATIOrJALF: FOR !DE PROCRAM 
Three broad questions seem important in working toward a rationale for 
the national space program: 
1. (8) What i e  the value of wrld leaderebip in space science and 
technologyP 
(b) What w i l l  be the price of @qud-lQ3 and mu"F86Sing the achieve- 
ments of the Soviet Union? 
2. Hov should the nonarilitary space program relate to t&e total nation- 
al epace effort, including military mieelle and space activities? 
3. How may the public interest be eerved by programe in space acience, 
by international cooperation In space activities, and by public- 
service or  canmercial spplicrrtions of space technology? 
Other, more specific questions fomulated in t h i s  report appear inevitably to 
lead back to these three; In consequence, these broad questian~i may be Viewed 
as a point of departure for the discussioa that follaws. 
SCME TEN!t!A!TIVE GUIDELINES 
The discussion presented in this report caa help In rea- the u l t h t e  
decisions of policy on the hard questions of over-all level and rate of the 
natlonsl space effort; however, no formula is suggested for  sutU?natically 
assigning relative weights t o  such factors a8 the costs of possible space 
sctivitles, the value of paten tegic, technical, or  economic mine, 
3 
ccmtpeting demsnde on available resources. 
# 
The guidelines listed below, then, in themselves do not caPpprise the 
rationele for a program. bther, taken vi# the apeclfic questions set farth 
irr ens- sectione of the report, they may suggest to  ttrose charged with 
rerrponeibility for policy decision logical cour~ea of Inquiry to follow in 
atttrcking the crvcr-all problem. 
o World leaderehlp in apace science and technology esn be a potent 
political and psychological weapon in the struggle wlth catlmunism. 
Much af its value as a cold- yespoll could be lost, hawever, If we 
do not act In the relatively near future; and r e a  leadership 
may well prove i n c r e a e i n g l r  difficult  as t h e  g a a  on. 
The mlnlmum price of a substantial space effort aspenaS largely upon o 
the costs of vehicles and facil i t ies;  therefore, coat efficiency con- 
sideration9 ipdicate that  vehicles and faci l i t ies  which can serve 
interchangeably inmilitary, scientific, public aenrice, and other 
applications would offer large rewards. 
!&e rate of progress in space program will be heavily influenced by 
national policy on the military and non-military parts of the program; 
e.g., vhether the policy aims a t  mutual reinforcement of these two 
parts Instead of the non-interf'erence wfiich hae prevsiled in the 
past. 
o 
o To obtain adequate public support of the relevant basic sciences is 
v i t a l  for maximum rate of progress in apace technolagy. 
activit ies involve nearly a l l  of the sciences, public suppoFt of a 
space program amounts to support of science in general. 
A nlopber of ways exist for - the U.S. to take the init iative in inter- 
Since space 
o 
national cooperation i n c l u  use of the 
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ana failure follcrm upon fa - .  
O m  basic Saviet tactic is employed to achieve these effects: 
plana for rcrture Saviet spgce activities are characterizdl 86 trlrauy s d e n t i f i u  
and davated to peaceful progress9 while the military implications of paet 
Soviet 
crtiops directed at selected countries and audiences. In contrast, plans fop. 
future U.8, sprce activities m x  depicted by the Scndete as servhg aiilitarp 
objectives, while p t  U.8. space succesees are -zed and d,e!prlved ob 
laili.t;ary 8 m - o  
gained tbmrugh its a m t e d  military strength d scientific achlevwm?nts to 
htlmldate lesser nat3ona In the Aree wctirld--and lf possible the Wted Stater 
iteelf--without arousing the apprehensions of neusa l i s ta  d pacifistso 
successes are enphized at certain ldmes in uarnhgs srd &clar- -
The Soviet Union thus has been exploiting t&e pirestAge e 
(me soviet leaders seean to  have exploited each successful space lamch= 
ing fur pdlltical ends. In ~ a m e  cases these ends may have influenced the 
thing, ar perhaps evep the decision t o  attempt a particular space shot. For 
w e ,  $.I& a fat days after sputnik II was launched, leaders ob the -ld 
caermmist muvement aseemb~ed in MOSCOW to  celebrate ths 40th anniversary ab 
fh6 BolShdk ReValUt iOno The launching ~ovided SO- foP. athum 
the msePibled camunlst leaders, who met at a time when the effects of the 
H\mecarian rebellion, and of Polish insubordinatioa, were still be- fe l t  la  
fhe camun2st world. Moreover, It enabled Khrushchev t o  boast of soviet - 
stre- a t  a time when the world was Inclined t o  speculate that Saviet lpilj- 
Whatever lQmmh&mvs rdLe in the developuimt of Soviet space E& r i r s i l s  
te-, there can be no question that he has been the prlncipsl agent of 
Its exploltatlon far polltical ends. TNlRmunh as he has consaliaated his 
it will play an increasing role in H e t  gTsld otrategg. 
Soviet space leadership to man the tyjumph of eociarlist over capitalist 
acience and *try, the intezpretation will color that countzyva expectations 
e 
ccanadc viabiuty of the two 8ystems, and perhaps its aesesg~lent 09 their 
ul-b milltary S t s e n g t h o  m s e  estimates may lead the third country to 
act in sruch a way as to help validate them; for w e ,  by turaiag to the 
Soviet thrios far technical assistance and by sendlng its stdents there for 
technical and sclentiric training. 
Questhn: Asslaming that the U.S, can raise foreign est& 
toring the fact and the image of U.8, tecbnlcal 
eq-ty (if not superiority), how can it 
achieve this restoration wlthout u r & m h h g  
belief In our peaceful lntentloasl 
mates & OW f d X t Y ?  national ~ h o g t h  by -8- 
The Soviet government has played up its space achievements at haw w i t h -  
out reirtralnt, so that astronautical ascendency is one of the outstanding 
facts of Soviet life and has been used, as a pr3.m Illustration of the inhemllt 
0 
mt be difficult for to lnatch OUT budget b C w e S 9  and their wavth 
lgay already be an established fact. If l itt le iS done by the United B t a t e ~  
PQY, ths U,S,S,R, msy later be able to match and offset almost any actiopvl 
taken by the U.8. 
Any &talbd consideration of the ecrmlmic f e a s i b U ~  to the U.S.8.R. 
a heavy, sustained eff'ort in space must proceed with the reaUzatiapI thaf 
the purchasing power of money in this activity in the S-et U J I I ~  l e  l l ke l y  
to be Ugh in relation to its purchasing pawer in the eco- ae a whole, 
since -tures for space activity may enjoy the artifically low W c e  
levels associated w i t h  lsoviet military procurement, 0 
Question: Should pLans be made 
of Atl8s /Ve5,  
These can par is^, based on pasload weight, are not c-ete, since tlae 
perfection of atndliarg equipment ia also iuporhnt, errd the use made! ai the 
payhid capacity is a v i t a l  consideration. bIaqv ueeful 
be &ople with m a d l e r  vddcle8, Huwever, payload wight is a vc~jr useful 
a because it seta tbe scale of possible activitierr--thbga can be dame 
can ana will 
within a paylod of pounbr that cannot be done in 100 pounds or 8- in 
manned flight, where about a tos. of! payloaa is required ae a h.ln.tanm, 
co8T8mIJzADERsBIP 
lple grrice of capturing and maintaining leadership w i l l  be detemlned by 
the coet of those programs l l k e l y  to lead to s general view that the Unlted 
States is ''ahead" in sstrcmautlcs; tb is  price may be partly offset by the 
value accruing to other obJectives f r a n  these programs. There are no foraal 
2, In th is  new f ie ld many possible "firsts," but tbree may be 
judged to be of psrticular 
a* 
b, 
SWCC?Ssful orbiting and return Of a man b 
Successful photograpby, of reconnaissance quality, f r a u  a 
satellite 
3. paylosd size is an bpartant far assessing relatlve sterdirr(t 
because it is eeeential3y a forecasting parameter: posses~~on of a larger 
payload capsbillty -lies better prospects for eccrring cdgnificant "firsts" 
or 0- de!Sirable accaapli-t6. 
far l e m p  will be set by costs of develgpment and Init ial  operation of 
the vehicles and associated facilities required t o  maintain an adequate growth 
of payload capab i l l~  and acceptable levels of reliability. 
e 5. lpae vehicle develop& progmn must be supplemented by vigaraus, 
but less costly, efforts to provide payload arssemblles (scientific ~t3uments, 
etc.) that w i l l  demonstrate useful employment of the vehicle. The objectivee 
served by flight of these payload asseniblies--scientific, military, public- 
service--will have t o  Justify the cost of sustained use of the vehicles and 
facilities after the leadership potential has been exploited In initial oper- 
ations. 
60 Y other ~b jectives-scientific, military, public-service--~deqptel~ 
jutiiy the cost of achieving capabilities tbat enable successful canpetition, 
then ths M c e  of leadership is slight. The Soviets can evidently enjoy 
"leadership" a t  very l l t t l e  apparent cost BO long as the capabilities acqyired 
0 
Curectly frci~~ the military missile program are adequate. 
In prhciple, the cost of leadership could be assessed in  the following 
2. Select the sctians that can best prav&de d use t h e e  re- 
do i t  within several years, it i s n o t  worth the m t u r e  of severel bIlfinn 
dollars and the resulting drsin on the econaoy and reso~trces involvsd. 
Gcrme argumests that have been heard in support of this thesie includet 
o The whole Matory of' Soviet asixonautics indicates that Soviet ao- 
t i v i t y  hss, far nearly 8 generation, been pursued vith detenxbatka, 
vith a singleness of purpose, and w i t h  ccmaistent support; and 
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on ar aa saaethlng else. It might a b 0  lead to the conclusion that fbn 
&qpee of sagrgc#.t of soy such activlw should be ccamldered an ita own laerite 
0 - 
- s u a :  To what extent would the 8f3Vbg resulting 
Aum a cossiderably reduced epprce program 
Insure that other activities, which m l g h t  
be considered mare meritorious, w o u l d  
benefit? 
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of Defense, as weU a6 a statement of certdn ob3ectives bearbg on the w- 
tion of Civilisn-military cooperstion. Subsection 102(b) slates that eer~= 
nautical aul space activities-- 
shall be the responsibility &, aud &al l  be directed by, 
a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical Srd 
space activities sponsored by the United States, except 
tht activities peculiar to or primarily associstea vitb 
the development ae v e a .  systems, military operati-, 
or the defense af the united states (Including tbe re- 
search ami developaent necessary to make effective pro- 
09 Defense; 0 
fOa the dofepse of the Vhiw S b h 6 )  shall be ths 
mspanSibility 09, and ~ h d l  be directed by, the D e m t  
(8)  bsve spec- -evsnce to the question of civilisn4lItar~ 
(6 )  
w i t h  national defense of discoveries that have military 
cies, to the civilian agency established to direct slld 
costrol noar-military aer0;nautiCal and space activities, 
uf infarmation as to  discoveries which have value or 
significance to that -cy; 
(8 )  
sad engineering resourcea of the Wted Statepl, with 
close cooperation 
United States in order to avoid w c e s 8 a r Y  duplication 
of effort, facilities, and equipment. 
%e making available to  agencies a i r e c w  concerned 
vrrl\ae or ~-1cBlbCe~ and %be f u r n i w  by Such w- 
 he most effective u t i l i za t ion  of the scientific 
all interested agencies of the 
The Act also specifies certajSmaChlnery for formal C o o r d i P a t i o I l  of 
aeronautical and space actldties. 0 
!Che fundamental. allocation of responsibility for aeronautical and space 
activities within the Gove course a comprdse, which egpears to  
- 
ref lect  several identifiable 8ttitude8, beliefs, and policies, It may be 
ueeful t0 l ist  sane of those theme8 here briefly 80 ae to bring out their 
interconnection and their unavoidable overlap. 
1. There was a belief that  the primary yield fKnn the exploration of 
epsce vould be scienti i ic bawledge, and an assumption tbat governmental ef- 
fort toward the acquieitian of ecientific knowledge should be primarUy 
civiUan bear\lile, eo to  epeek, scientific knowledge me civilIan in nature. 
It was thoughtthat the cooperation of the scientific camnunity in 2, 
the United States and abroad vould be more euccessfully eollcited by a civilian 
than by a military egency, 
3. It YBB eugposed that civilian direction would make the nat ional  epace 
p v  look more "peacepu1" abroad than military direction uould. 
4, A few persons looked on the public excitement evoked in the Unikd 
Stater by the launching of the first Soviet satel l i tee  as affording an oppor- 
tudw t0 establish a Department of 6cience b tht Ca3inst; far thm, rP.r?3lor? 
control of epace research and developent wa6 a ndnimum m e a e u r e .  
5. The operation of military space systems was acknwledged to be an 
exclusive concern of the mllltary, t o  the extent t ha t  space systems could be 
identified BB excluelvely military0 
60 If was believed that reeearch and develogment for military space eye- 
the hnndn terne should predanlnantly, though not necessarily exclusively, be 
of the military, 
erstioare of special ed-use requi rwnts j  special security (cmei i ica t ion)  
requirements; eatablished patterns of relationships vlth military end-users 
and with industrial contractors; and the mamentum of established military 
program6 and organization. 
This belief was corroborated by or aeeocisted With conaid- 
R-349-flABA 
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7. There may have been eane d i f 3 S € t t i B f € & C t i O ~ 1  with the previoue progrese 
of bal l is t ic  end space technology under military guidance. fnconclusive die- 
pubs and recrimiaetion over responsibility for gsst budget cute ard low pro- 
gran 1iPrit.s mey kve contributed to congressional support for e partial "fresh 
S t a r f e n  
8. mere was considerable respect for tbe SbillS and achievement of the 
14et i cnd  Advbory Caarnittee for Aeroaautics (HACA), e c i v l l l a n  or&zation 
that had done much research of military imporlance and had coaperated with 
the military in Its research progrannning. The decision to make lpAcA the nucleus 
of the new apace organizatlon--wlth mador &angets in authorized mieeians ad 
in cuntracting authori+-lnplied a preference for Civilisn control of sgaw 
m s e ~ c h  and develo-nto 
9. The certainty of overhpplng ,jurisdictions YBB recognized. Canilicte, 
It was supposed, would be resolved through formal CoOrtUnathg machinery sad 
in the last resort by the President. 
10. Duplication ai research and developent effort was r i t e  con- 
demned, but 8ane voices were heard In favor of eane ~ l l c s t i o n  as -Creasing 
the probability of payoff. 
"umece s sary " dupLica tion. ) 
(The Statutoly ionnula Cited abova &WeawS 
The enactment of the loatlanal Aeronautics and Space Act did not abolish 
the problem or terminste the diecuesione growing out of the themes that bave 
Just been enumerated, Preslcmablg they wiu. be evaluated periodically in the 
l ight  of developing experience In the addninigtration of the A c t  atxl ths oper- 
ations of NASA under It. 

!&e National Aeromutice and Bpace Act set up twlo ~hev bodies for bter- 
the Beorcterles 09 State and Defense, the Administrator of NASA, t)K Chdnmn 
Of the AEC, an additional &er fran the Federal Government appointed the 
preelidsnt, atd three eminent msn frcm private l i fe  also appointed by the 
Preaibent. Its sole f’unction l e  to advise the ~residrl?nt in the discharge ab 
his statutory duties under Subeectian 2Ol(e) of the Act, which are to: 
(1) 
including the policies, plans, programs, and acccanplismts 
of all agencies of the United States ein such activi- 
ties; 
survey a ~ .  ~ ~ 1 1 i f i c ~ 1 z l t  aeronautical d space sctivitics, 
(2) 
space activit ies %o be conducted by eencfer  of the Wteb 
B h t e r j  
develop a carnprehensive progra~ of aeronautical ard 
(3) & s a t e  and ftC responsibility for the direction 
of major a-utlcd and space activit leej  
(4) provide for efiective cooperation between the Wt&on- 
al Aeronautic8 and space Administrsfion and the D e p a r t a a t  
of Deiease in all such activities, end epeciiy which ob 
such activit ies lnsy be carried on concurrently by both ouch 
agencies notwithetandirrg the a~rrlgrament of priarsr)r re8poas%- 
biUty therefor to one or the other ai ouch agenciesj ard 
(5) r e8o l~e  diiierenceo arlrhg ammg deparlaenta~ srd agen- 
cies of the Wted States with reepect to  aeronauticsl and 
space activitiee under thlr A c t ,  lncludbg Wferenceo CUI 
t o  whether a particular project i r  an aeronautical and rpace 
actioity, 
Liaison Caaaittee. It nuw consists of a Chairppsrr appointed by the Preuid.ent, 
four rqweseatatlvee asslgned by the Secretary of Defen6e respectively frola 
the Deperlment of Defense aad the three lpilitary services, and four reme- 
oentativer assigned by the A-strator of WUA. 
section *(b) that  HASA and WQ -- 
!Che Act provides sub- 
through the Liaiaon C d t t e e ,  shall advise and consult 
With each other on all matters Within their respective 
jurisdictions relatlng to aeronautical and space activi- 
ties and shall keep each other fully and currently In- 
formed with respect to such activities. 
The orlglnal authority of the C l v i l i a n - M i l i t a r y  Lialscw Coasrittee exladed 
osl3y to reparting cmclusions, findings, and recaormendations, lnclud.lng die- 
scats end non-participation, t o  the Administrator of lUBA and the Becretary 
of Defense. 
Presidential approval of a revised charter for  the Cmmittee increasing I t 0  
On JUy 1, 1959, M A  and the Department of Defen8e announced 
authority, The major change in what was called the "CMLC Term of Reference" 
directs the C d t t e e  and its chairman to deal vith jurisdictioaal differeaces 
when they arise instead ob penultting t h i o  mediatory action only upon the 
request ai loAsA or WD. 
19an-statutory machinery ha8 been devised for  purposer of mpecial co- 
ordination. For example, baeic research a t  v a h n u ~  outside inetitutiornr i r  
s\rpported Independently by MSA, the N a t i o n a l  Science Formbstian, the Office 
of mval Research, the office Ot 8clentiflc Reeearch In the Air Force, and 
the Office of Ordnance Reeearch In the Amy. The agencies concerned exchange 
lists of projects received, projects approved, and amounte of money granted, 
Fram t h e  to t h e  their representatives meet to coordfaate their grants. 
Another -le of special-purpose coordination is provided by growd- 
support facilitiee. Ihc operation of space vehicles requires several diiierent 
systems3 scae ob the faci l i t ies  and personnel involved in these eyekana can 
be used h a  camnon (see Section VI1 of t h i s  docment). 
coordinating c-ttee frcm HAW and DOB) drew ug an Interagency agreesent, 
rince signed by the Secretary Oi Defense aad the AdaPillietrator of IWA,  
er tabl ieblq a Space Flight Ground Facil l t les Board. 
In the fall of 1958 a 
Under the weaneat,  
that Board is to review proposals for  new ground lnatrranentatlon faci l i t ies  
where new traw si tes  would be required or where a total Government in- 
reetaexat of more than $2w,OoO is involtred; to reccanwd the a~~ocatiopl of
respoauibility for funding, coautructw, a d  operating those faci l i t ies j  
and to review annually the national bdget  for  global tracking, data acqui- 
sition, and camnunlcations facil i t ies.  
and manage facilities needed for the trackine, data acquisition, and CoQIPuDj- 
cati<we support of Its primary space miseione, but certain caninon facilities 
are to be wed "vhenever feasible." m e r  spocffied canditione, site w e -  
Each agency is to f u d ,  construct, 
ment may be divorced from the operation of inetrraaentatif= azd 
e copmUnicatioSe equipment. Dirsgreementa are to be reported to the Adminis- 
trator of X W A  ard the Secretary of Defense, 
An adbitional method of coordination is that which %e imposed by the 
preastarer of Congressiansl inquiry. Vpon the receipt of separate requsrtr 
fxwm H&8A am3 Do6 for authorlziq or appropriatAq lsgialation, w e s r i o n e l  
~ O p P I P i t t e e i  have requested crosa-wdvers 
each c e r t m  that the other egency'r did mt unnecesurrily dupli- 
cate hi. oun. l lria practice has contributed to advance coordirrrrtioar betveen 
the agenciarr in anticipation of the inquiry, 
the reapsctive admbietratom, 
Am48 CW C-m AllD cxmmoRATIm 
When the kchniquea of ailitary-civilian coordination of agace activitiee 
w e r e  considered by -era in I t s  deliberation8 on what later became the 
a lktACuml A m u t i w  ard SpSce Act of 1958, the mhasie w plactd w for- 
m a l  mecbaul~a0. The executive process of allocating respoaeibllity for space 
activities, as one Corrgreeslonal d t t e e  put it, had to be altered irar a 
process of negotiation to a process of decisioaJnahing. me two orgaultatiaPIcl 
mainly concerned--HABA and WD--were t h o w t  to have separable area8 of pri- 
mary respon81bility, With a relatively small overlap. That overlap, or "grey 
area," waa to  be ruperlnwed by the coordinating machinery described above. 
Vp to m, the rtatutoq prcscriptiuina have been partially Ineffective 
and partldly untested. Tha Civillan-Mllitary Liaisool camrittee ~ e e ~ b ,  09
the whole, to have been liplited ln ita initial terms of reference, and by- 
passed by: 
of different degrees of formal structure and continuity, and (b) iniornral 
day-tow accamodatlon a t  the working level. 
have been sanewhat more active, but -1y as a 232gi6tZ'Y for negotiated W&- 
(a) the creation of 8everal -- ad hoc or epeclal-purpose committees, 
The Space Council seems to  
0 
e a t i d  caPrprosnises between sde; it agperars to have served 
R-349-IasA 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
fn the 1-t of experience to data wfth the Policy 
Council arrd the C l v l l i a n - M i l i t a r y  L i d e o n  Coesrittee, 
haw cen they fulfill their statutory re~poxmibffltiee 
ae deflned by Congreee? 
Would the Council be more effective vith 8 strong 
supporting eecretarlst or s eubordinate preparatory 
body? (Emgo, would the impleprentation of the per- 
dse loe  clauses of the Act  for an erscu- 
t lve secretarg appointed by the President sld cm- 
firmed by .ae  Senate be deslr&let) 
Uould the aoslgmnent of an active and experlamced 
In  Sec. a ( d )  of the Act) help harmonize the nili- 
tary and non-mllltary parte of the ? 
4411ltaX-y siiices 88 ilhdnmn of (RQX: (a0 provided 
Relatively lnfonual cooFdinatlon I s  be- practiced between HASA and 
DCB) on auch matters am management of ground-sqpport or booeteir devel-tj 
and thecle procedures are not fannslly codified by rtatutory embbhent 
by re@at&on. Day-to-day contact between the ocienldete, eu@neare, rud 
even 
ste f f  of EMiA srd WD, arrd growirrg fepilisrityvith the nature ob 
th4 R & D -1- sld thb &kd w#srmt -1-1 8hOUld help tO m t % C l m  
pate l ~ ~ l p ~  incipient dl f f lcu l t le r .  
Hawever, mutual acllrrmvvratloa of the sort mentioned here, whatever i t a  
merits, cannot be expected to resolve fum&mental qucrecws of epaw m e -  
m u a t .  For example, the decision on the size of the fraction of the groo8 
national product that should be devoted to  governnatal space actlvl~les 
Within the over& budget for spsce actlvlties, the division of fwd6 
and resgansibility between IOABA ard DCD is, aob w l l l  retn~dn, p a r t l y  OUterMe 
the control of thoae agencies, because cartain of the applicable policies 
wllf. be decided by Congreeo or by bi&er executive authori~.  EASA and DcB)# 
however8 enter the decisionaPehing process at eeveral different e w e s :  
i U F I J i w  the necessary technical inionastion, re- o v e r 4  policy 
to the ultimate decidba bodie8, applyiag and interpreting the necesearily 
general terms ob the decieiosrs, and reecrmmending modtf%catiau (not ea&- 
modlficatioaarr In  the eize of the over-all budget for space actdrities). Thc 
canbined weight ob lpAsA and DQ) action at  all of those stages may be in prsc- 
0 
tics nearly conclusive. 
Ibe "grey area" concept upon which Congres6 based i t a  sch- of or&- 
eational accammdatlon may be admlnlrrtratlvely unsatlsfyiag3 but the line 
between psilitary and non-milltary space activity cannot be clearly drawn on 
BP objective basis in laost Caeee. While military ard nan-milltsrg efforts 
m y  differ widely in intent, their p ~ ~ i o a ~ .  requirements may not differ 
lnat2ErIall.y. 
While there are serioue disadvantages to many foxms of dupllication be- 
tween - and MH), these disadvantages & not necessarily extend to technical 
caqpetition in research and development in the sense of canpet- p- 
toward the achievement of a camon R b D @. 
("controlled dupllcatlon") may in fact ultimstely mean a saving of time d 
SimultaneOUe parallel effort6 
a 
money as canpared with SUCC~SB 
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Thereforel space research and developmt activities of r&A81A and Den, are 
or can be mad,e cauplementary and mutuaJ.ly su,ppor!Ang. For -le: 
1. One mdn area consist8 of the partial coordination of program 
phmnlng through cantrolled duplicstim end whst might equally well be termed 
mccmtrdUed nm.iltapUcation:" the agreed- decision to abstain frcm research 
ani3 devekpmt in a given area belag covered by another agency. Tbis would 
require adequste provision, not necessarily farrmel, for regular review and 
Question: whst criteria should &de plnmrinn for 
"cantrciLled duglicatlon?" 
of research and Qvelqpment in DCQ is keyed to  the cancept of integrated 
-re l a  a certSin amcmnt af research, developnent and testing that lpAsA 
can be expected to per fom in direct participation in established millknry 
Question: On the basis of HACA eqerlencc, and current 
indieatdona of military activities, what level 
of meet support to  DOB) should be a e d  in 
m - 3  
In Bdditloa loAsA can contribute xtaterhUy to  a fcwaril-looldq defense 
posture by ena;aging in research and developnent not associated ath eetab- 
Uehed weapon programs. The objective here should be simply to accumikte 
a large assortment of nslid choices to explore in plsnning presently unhmr- 
able weapon system proJects.' This explaratory research atd dem1-t eifart 
may, therefore, f reqpnt ly  agpear t o  be illogical. 
rate of 
mRnt not 
Question: What cri upriate for setting the 
or research ana develcrp- 
is ted w i t h  an end use? 
3. DabandRASAnrey 
grouad-support f a c u i t i e s  
or contracted-out) 0 
Maxima exploitation 
buy or rent certain machinery, equipment, and 
fran me another instead of building them (in-home 
& equlpmts and facilities developed tmder prior 
military programs can contribute eubstantially to a more effective effort In  
the n c m 4 i t S r y  program because many itmm ctf heavy cost are lsrgely avoided: 
initial develaplacnt, provision of testing and production faci l i t ies ,  mlwne 
testing to establish fmctiaaiPg and reliability. A cost advantage will also 
w- accrue t o  purchase of equlpnent item fraa a larger production pro- 
gram, 
tensive testing is also of considerable importance both in cost and in the 
favorable public impact of fewer failures, 
The improVea re l iabi l i ty  to be w c t e d  in an item subdect to more ex- 
4. CertSin types of intelligence-gathering, both polit ical  and techno- 
logical, may be more effectively perfonued by a civilian than by a I;pilitary 
wency, and vice versa. 
or all of the data yielded by each. 
concemlng, the n o n d i t a r y  space effort--particularly with respect to the 
lnternatiosal campetitive aspects--will be more effective If relevant intelli- 
gence data are available. 
observation of open non-slilitary space experintents by others is a dource of 
intelligence information w i t h  military value; for  example, U.8, observation 
of Sputnurs has yielded inferences concerning Soviet w e a ~ .  Perbps some 
U.8. space activities, non-military and military, could be plannea With an 
eye to  provaking Soviet "reaction" most likely t o  field iafonestion bearing 
on particular intelligence needs. 
eepionage, or distortion of international cooperation. 
Both agencies may be appropriate etts*baers frcm sane 
The canduct of, and public statanent13 
Cin the other hand, diagnosis of data acquired from 
None of this has to  do with deceptia, 
in the future will be those agreement betveen the Department af 
R-349-IPASA 
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harmony and agreenent on Joint requirements between the m l l i t a r g  ard non- 
military programs are attained. The cost in both time and money will be much 
greater tmless effective means  are employed to make the requirements of the 
two ppajor elements of the national program canplement and support each other. 
Those concerned with the problem, therefore, vould do w e l l  to obtain views 
It fnm the military deparhente as w e l l  as fran M A .  
QW&~=: -a d.e~ehp?!eZl% g d S ;  S E & i B m  
both military and non-milltary ne&, be 
established? 
Assignment af responsibility t0 ETASA or DCXl for management of 8 glven 
program abed at joint developnent goals will probably depend upon such 
criteria as: 
8 0  The relative imporbace or urgency attached to the military and non- 
military phase8 of the Joint developaent goal. 
Improved program efficiency to be expected throu&h use of Unique 
skills and facilitiee lying within the purview of one or the other 
bo 
of the federal establisbents. 
Improved program efficiency to be expcted through close Integra- 
tion w i t h  another project that is clear ly related to the prime in- 
C. 
R-349-MSA 
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d. Policy decision to favor military or nan-idlitary -t of pro- 
Question: W i t h i n  theee or other relevant criteria, vhat 
decisioDls are in order with respect to a~lslgn- 
lng management responsibility far current or 
PhJUIed Of the ll&%OIld. 8 w 8  mm? 
One of the pr- objectives of the natlonel apace progran is the 
dvanceamnt of science. Since space activities have approached the iroprtiers 
assessment by both themetical aad laboratory atudles, Vith resulta baing 
by the International Geopbyeical Year satellite effort,  yet to be carried 
-0 A t  least to tbis h t ,  then, the physical capabilities far epsce 
A 
Std‘f  R m  
th Congress, 
QuesH-r E m  can a broad ard YQOZWS research program 
be s t l x h t e d  adl s u p p o r t d - 4  at what rate 
of expenditure--to provide exprbent0  ccogwt- 
lble w l t h  the large vehicular capabllltles al- 
ready foreseeable? 
possible of scientlf%c sources, there I s  need for a syetematlc way to 
mlneat capabilities must be carried out with &e regard far the poUtical 
l a  strong and clear. 
Queetlon: How should the glanned program of space 
capabi l i t ies  be comeyed to the sclentlflc 
c-tyr 
as a sclentAflc to be used as effective- as possible. 
Questlos: To what extent should the goale ob the d c l e  
development program exceed the clear require- 
ments of establithed scientific iwtscigakiorast 
d o  Planetasy R o  
b o  Geopborelcal 
C. Lunar 
eo Solar 
i o  cossnolq#cal 
a t l a  and sparse matter in the interplapetary regions of the solar eyetaaO 
This actlvlty will probably be characterized by fairly intense initial eqplor- 
ation to establlsh a general picture of r a d i a t i a ~  end matter, followed by 
a ccmparativelg low rate of "patrd" activity to observe mriatiozm of en- 
on the )800010 
Lunar iwestigatiau can be dme frau the earth, fran satellites sra3md 
I t se l f  d, wwt t&oroqbly, by men and instsvments on the ~~0001. the 
Planetary iwest lgat lm is a general class of research within wfiich 
study of the earth iteelf I s  one i t em.  B@oraticua of the planeta, there- 
fore, CBIP be generasized fMm -tlmr of the earth-the re-ta 
include satellites about the subject planet and, for those planets w i t h  
tolerable surface c d t i a ,  men and instruuent~ on tbe subdect -to e 
mlar Inveetlgatlaas canbine the featuree of free-apace exploration 
(measurement of radisticm fran the em) arrd sane features of planetary in- 
vestigaticm ( O ~ S ~ Z T E L ~ I C W  of the surface 09 the 8Un) iram Statioavr in earth 
eatdl$te6  snd a -0 
Cosmological inveetig;etiapls are cacerxmd with dbservatbn of the \mi- 
ver8e outside the solar syeterm and study of the large-ecale piroceesea of 
nature. The reqylrements Include free-space radiation measurements spd 
observatlom fran statione In  earth satell i te8 and on the moo~n. 
These generaUzations suggest classes of experimental mechanlmi: 
a. Instrunented tree-space vehicles. 
bo Vehicle6 CzlrrJIlDg inetr\nnents and men I n to  orbits about, or 
onto the surfaces 09, the planets of the solar system. 
C. Scientlflc stations in earth eatellites. 
do Scientific statlon(s) on the moon. 
Advancement of science 
expeniUture of vehicles and 
through space-flight werimeate will re- 
lncurrlng of g m u d  operating costs. 
~ ~ s t i ~ a n :  what  vel of expenditrtre (for production oi 
developed flight eq?lipnent and aperatlon of 
ground facil i t ies) should be devoted to flight 
of scientific instrumentst 
Advancanat of science will also requlre research and evaluation, by 
theoretical and laboratory efforts, before and after accunpllslpllRpt of 
f l ight  program. 
Quest la :  What level of expenditure should be devoted 
t o  research and evaluation before and after 
any flight program? 
R-349-USA 
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Questionr Should the research mal developnent efforts of the 
non-snilitarp part of the national. space program be 
sfrangly focused on one or a few large-scale goale 
euch as a manned satellite laboratory, a statim 
09 the moon, or manned exploration of a plenet? 
If so, at what pace should the program proceed? 
In sddition to use of space vehlclee ae tools for research in basic 
ecience!e, there l e  also clear'need for fl-t experhmts to advance 
e s & m d a g  sciences on vhich epace technology resti. In particular, it will 
be necessary to tes t  a d  evaluate engineering materials and devices umler 
etructura3. mrrterisls, seals, lubricants, windnwe, surface finiehee, paper 
supplies, orientation controls, guidance equipexit, caarounication devices, 
Question: A t  wbat level. should ef'fort be applied to flight 
ard ground activities for englneerw research? 
7-22-59 
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The publlc of the U.8. Government on space matters 
c o ~ i ~ t e n t l y  stress the b~~0-w Or international cooperation in space 
tivities, vrrlued for i te  own uake as well ae for reasons of national. security 
and -6-0  the^ National Aerapautlcs lud Space Act of 1958 (Section 205) 
sut?mr&zee lUSA to engage in a pr- of internatioolsl cooperetlozq and 
HASA haa e6tabl%&ed Olpflce of International Pr~grame. 
dmnnrr the ogpos*tt.tnitiee for internstid cooperation in aetronauticrr, 
the most readlly avdlable Important opportunity is that far cooperative 
efforts between 6CientietS of the U.8. aad other coulltries exchangiag 
informtion, devlslng e w e  experimeats and mutually studying the resulting 
data, 
to carry invited "guest payloads" belonging to foreign institutions. 
One step toward more direct cooperation might be to use U.8, vehicle19 
Qpprtm%tdee ror impmtmt p 1 i t i C a a  benefits should d 6 t  in the need 
for a world-wide network of sites for tracking, observation, Commmicatian, 
and recovery, 
burden on the U.S., but rather as Internationally financed sites where cloee 
collaboratlcm between American technicians and foreign nationale became6 
practicable. 
of rn than naninal -tent by the countries selected. Considerable flexi- 
bi l i ty  can be exercised in selecting the exact locatlone and the extent of 
individual facilities for best p o l i t i d .  sdvantage~ 
!These sitee need not be viewed sinply as an Inevitable financial 
Such cooperative efforts wuld amount to real participation 
Lsunching facilities on foreign s o i l  might also be considered. For 
w e ,  the U.8. is ncIv basing Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in 
-ape (the ~ t e d  Iungdan and Italy, at present)--the same kind of missiles 
cufiently be- used for space-vehicle launchings. It msy be possible to 
R-3490- 
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axreage a CoqPBlgtivB program wlth any of these countries to prepare m c e  
vehicles aad launch them f'rcun these IRBU bases, the local military hadware 
be- wed ea the basic eqvlp~mnt. In the Unlted Kln&aa, available arreato 
0 
mcestmry 8-83 sdl an active space science plap prepaml un&r govern- 
ment attbpices* %e ILtallan govemnt  could, in  a reasollable tims, plrapida 
could, tmahr suitable armn@mmta, contribute to the Implementation of arpr 
QI f a  s o i l  would be entirely COpBoamnt with etandard Soviet practicerr. 
The launchhg 09 a satellite f r a u  Red chins, for example, albeit w i t h  W e t  
equipuent, would have qulte an Impact on world opinion. 
Question: Should the United States take the ln%tlatlve 
in joint lnternatlanal support and collective 
effort? 
e prolep.ame of cooperation between 0.6. an8 foreign sclentiets mey provide 
control, d lipiitatlon spstem for the regulatbn of certain apace 
activities in the future. 
AS the activities of the United loatiane on peacetime umes of outer 
Questim: &ow ebauld llAsA take an active role in 
preperaeon far lnternatlcrnsl ne@%- 
atians relating to epace act lvi t leet  
U.S., the U.S.S.R., and othem. 
cxmmICA!rIa, !QwIGA!I!Ia, Am MEmmcmGY 
* 
8efe l l i tes  for ccII1IIRmlcatioI1, navigation and metearology 8sb undR1. 
aotivu davelcrpuent for both militmy ard civi l  puzpcaes. !Chey ~psy ultimately 
bve p&Uc service value or might even lead to direct cumercial appllcatlon 
for prof%te fn assessing the role of such apace de~lCe6 far public servlce 
pmp8e6# coat capqparisoae w l t h  ccmpetitlve system may be more important 
then in mllltary evaluations where other factors may Piredcmiaafe. 
proepgme uf investigation are un&r way in NASA and imiustry to ClaFirp 
the nature a d  extent of commercial appllcatlons of aetronautics. such 
rtudiee ere exgressly stated as an obdective of the Act (Bubsectlon 102( c), 
rter~ (4)) ard ~IQUCI- authxri~ed far HASA. 
Additianal epplicatlons of a public service nature may f l o w  f’run aper- ., 
w atlon of observation s a t e l l l b e .  
tlahrly of remota areas; geological surveysI identlfybg formation patkrns; 
These would Include aerlal  mapping, par- - _  
m o d t o r i n g  of river netmrks; forest-fire warning; saow surveys; Iceberg 
Question: Are potential c ivi l  applications of lspace 
systems and technology being adequately 
investlgatedl 
Al4mEum 
zbe large boay of hobbylets in fields relevant to astronautics are a 
very useful resource worthy of serious official attention. Radio f3n~teUr6 
have przovided a good deal of useful data concerning algnals fran satellites 
* Mare detalled Informat 
the Space flkrrilbook, pp. 192 
sa teUte  systems may be found in e 
+w Space Himdbaolr, pp. 17l-1 
I 
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launched to date; std nuneroua non-professional astronomers have particlpated 
in the "m-" SySte0l far optlcal obsermtioa of satellites. Beee 
a 
patient snd often W e d  observers can be of increasing usefulness if pro- 
emcouragedt but should slso be the subject of a systepIcrtic ef for t  to  arrive 
at  the Intended result at  a lower level of bodily hazard. 
Questiont To what extent should HASA provide for this 
segmRnt of public interestt 
ACCOUMPlXi At9) CEARlIJaC FOR ECOmoMIC BENEPITS 
0 Altho* it may not now be possible to fix a timetable for specific 
ecunanlc applications of space activity, it can be predicted w i t h  sane con- 
fidence that they will occur, that they will begin within a few years, and 
that they vill be substantial, 
On the assumption that the econdc  benefits derived fran space activi- 
t ies,  ard the differential cost of effort devoted to e e c u r a  those banefib, 
e m  or w i l l  bec- partly expressible In dollar equivalents, the question i e  
d e e d  of accounthg and charsing appropriately for them. A t  least prellml- 
nary cansideration could be given to several conceivable methods of hadl lxg  
the matter. 
If the Federal Government conducts certain space activities that field 
t c d c  benefits and does not attempt to segregate the expense or impose a 
cbsrge for use, the cost is In effect being defrayed by general revenues, 
pr inc lpd ly  frau taxation. Tbis regarded as tantamount to a subsidy 
in favor of the users a t  the expeas 
0 
POn-USers, If m. Such a method 
R-3kg-nASA, 
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It should not, -9 be restricted by reference to the present statutory 
lhlb ab ft#! JWlshictlm uf M A .  Once ern ecmadc benefit fraa a apace 
aatlvity is ehacm to be feasible BB a result of research, developneat, d 
Penuanent aparatioll of a space facil ity for ccimnercinlltr practicable use 
woultlseat~ to be outside BAsA'e preeent authority except to the extent fhat 
authorits v0uI.d not seem to extend t~ the regulation of public-utility-type 
Questiom: What, if arpgrthing, ehould be done to encourage 
more active interest in camPerclal space eye- 
terne by private enterprise? 
R-349-x?AsA 
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To accanplish all planned space flight programe# it w be necessary 
to bave world-vide fscllities for launchlng, traclripg, cannatnication, cappu- 
tatian and recover30 I) 
The SOU- brief outline l s  int;eabed to serve as a qyelitative re- 
minder of (a) the fofsl magnitaxle of the national inveslztent, (b) the over- 
lapging nature of the civil sld milftary req-ts, ard ( c )  the i8;rplica- 
tione for International coqperation. 
Actual costs and other b t a i l e d  data concerning ground facilities should 
be obta,lned llirectly fkau the responsible agencies. 
A joint DCB)-IpA8A d t t e e  has made an inventOry of all exlstlng facili- 
tlee, SB well as of all military aad HASA progrrerms requtrbg facilities, to 
determine where gaps exist and to prevent drtplication. 
0 
A t  the present t ime major missile test facilities are located at: 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Ncme of these facilities as presently constituted can accarmodste the 
Atlantlc Missile Range (MW!C, Patrick AFB) 
Pacific Missile Range (Point M u g u ,  Vandenberg AFB) 
win OW Test Range (pndall m) 
White Sanb Missile Range (Hol lanan AFB) 
larger launching rockets presently planned, Also, existing facilities could 
not ~ccoppllod8te large vehicles using nuclear propulslan ar sane chemical 
propellants because of contamlnatlon problems. 
cation of existing facilities and the establishment of m, remote facilltierr 
Thus, the extensive -1- 
0 
* 
Bee Space FTNlrlbOOk, p p ~  138-1390 
acquisition of 6IKitable real estate. 
The network of observation, traekf, and Camnmicatlon staficwa ohoult3 
eventuelly be adequate to perrmit contlnuow contact via vehicles f run the 
t ln t8  of launch? 
The follawlag I s  a sumnnary of present tracking facllltlee, i n c l u  
certain uf the planned elQanBione: 
Those statlaas U e  between latitudes 52.5O North and 350 South. 
To accannodate vehicles us- polar orbits or orbits ipcliped more than 
9 to the equator, additional Moonwatch station8 closer to the polar regionfa 
would be required. 
Of all the tracking facilities, these etation8 are the simplest to equip 
aed operate. Eqdpent is usually no more elaborate than a amall. satellite 
R-349-W 
c -2; 
trackirrg telescope sld a radio receiver tuned to a time standard. Ihe 
8 
statim can be uperated by twr, people. 
network of precision photogmphtc stations which use Baker-- cmueras. 
There are tweltre Baker-lmm station6 between latitws 450 mrth strd 
300 south, located att 
As 3x1 the case of the Moonwatch stations, this neimrk w i l l  r e m  
expansion to track vehicles on near-polar orbits. 
Minitrack StatlOoll8 
llhese radio statiosle wetre set up as a part of the Vanguard 
Satel l i te ProJect. 
A t  present there are twelve stations between latitudes 38.50 Berth sdl 
340 south, located at: 
Antigua, Rritiehllest W e e  BatistaFie3B, Bavrrna, Cuba 
Mayaguana Island Quito, ECuadar 
Grand Turk Island Lima, Peru 
8 a a D i s O p  C a l I f d  Antofagasite, Qlile 
Blossaa Point, MBryland Santiago, Chile 
Ft. Stewart, Georgia Woanera, Aurrtral la 
0 
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In ardm to perform continuow tracking of an lnterplanetay vehicle, at 
leaat three sadtsbly located tracking f a c l l l t l e a  will be required. 
A t  the present time the tsacking facility at  Goldstone I s  ths only one 
in the U.8. vhich I s  adequate far tracking deep-space probes. Ime tracker 
copeists of a movable antenna 85 feet in diamster ami seneitive receivers 
for tracldng signale trawrdtted by a space vehicle. 
Present M A  plane call for two new facilities, located In  South Af"rica 
d AM-. 
The information obtained fran each network mentioned muet be processed 
by one or more computers, and q new launching or tracking fad l l ty  trill 
require access to a suitable c 
0 
+space -, pp. e - 8 3  
R-349-nCIsA 
7-22-59 
b7 
ccxputer facilities generally re conditianing, special power 
suppl~es~ dust-free and moisture-free bush& fairly elaborate checkout d 
RBWVSEF- 
flight e e vehicle88 Qic vebiCh6 ClLZTJ- 
lng pscksges that are to be returned to the earth's surfbce, will require 
recovery f acilifies. 
For m e d  systems, the recovery plans and equlpnent w i l l  necessarily 
be qulte elaborate in order to Insure adeqwte safety. The recovery equip- 
m e n t  will generally involve ships, aircraft and considerable ms~lpcner. 
Question: What past of the costs for caDlstructlon 
operation of ground facilities CBP be proper- 
l y  charged to the non-military part of the 
aaticmal epace program? 
!the natlon'~ astronautics assets in vehicles are, at present, chiefly 
the products 02 military prograw. 
Vehicle develogmente fall into four general categories: 
1. Xlnor modification of item8 already dstreloped in mllltary 
PrWra- (e.g., m-1171;). 
2. Extension, by supplementa,ry developpsnt, of capabilities of basic 
Items Aum military program6 (e+, Atlas/Vega). 
3. Hew developtents based an use of camponeats develcrped by the 
Queetion: How much effort should be applied to presentlJ 
billties in these categoric13 to serve the ob- 
jectives and neede of the national apace progt~W 
m t o o d  launching-~ehicl~ development pOSSi- 
The general trend of posdbillties is Id lcatcd in Table 1 sad Big. 1. 
Since all of the payload figures and first-flight-test dates may not corres- 
pond exactly to the latest official planning, the responsible agencies ehould 
be consulted for conflnu~tlon, revision, or fuller diecuseion of theee de- 
ttrils. Cost figures and other program details are also best obtnrnca iroap 
the agencies and contractors concernede 
The cagablllties of the various vehicles have been summarized in Table 1 
w l t h  reference to a standard capability-that of placing a sateUte pay- 
load on orbit 300 miles above the  earth's surface. 
is related to other interesting payload figures for a given rocket assembly 
This slxuxbrd cagablUt;g 
by the curve of Fig, 2. 
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It should be noted that the dates listed on Table 1 are dates 
a which a m e t  flight test I 8  8 C h e d U l s b o  
asid to functbn With reasanable reliability mag b e - 4  ccummly ls--trsll 
The time when a system can be 
b m  thi8 -St &st dab0 
The nmber of fl-t test vehicles required to brlng a system to oper- 
ational x-mdbeea I s  a hi- variable and Indefinite nmtter, a~ the data 
in !Fable 2 indicate, 
PAXLOAD CARRIERS 
In a d d i t l O n r  to the la- vehicles there are others that actually 
house the payloadej these are literally apace V e h i C l h c l o  
!Qw payload carriers for racplorer axxl Vanguard cost comparatively l i t t le ,  
although they required a long tine for developmnt. But tbs plr;tload &er8 
for sputnik III Sild fap. Macoverer rapresent lnajor und.ertakil38~. 
Several progrsme now in developnent involve large, oollllplex, and ex- 
pensive payload carriers: epecificaUy, ProJect U S - U ~  ( R t ? d 8 6 8 D C e  
Satellite), Dyna-Soar (Manned Aerospace Globed. GUder), d Project Mercury 
(Maanea Satellite). These programe, vhich represent heavy natlonal lnveot- 
ments, req- not only thst the apace vehicle be large, but also that it 
include camplete provirions for such items as Internal power, eda-01 of 
en-t and mtentatlon, and cananmicatla. 
These three propmi portend the larger spsce vehicles that w i l l  have 
to be developed for use w i t h  t h e  large launching rOckRb 
It seem8 quite likely that tbe time and money required to develop ami p- 
duce the larger payload carriers (peSticUlar3.y manned vehicles) w i l l  be 
-0  
canparable with the time and 83011 
launching rockets. 
to develop anb produce the 
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Question: I8 proper eprpbasl~ being placed on developent 
of payloads and payload d e r s  for use wlth 
the large launching rockate now in developnent? 
a 
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IX. SOURCES OF INFORMA!I!ION 
It is suggested that reference be ma& t o  National Aeronautics and 
Space Act of 1958, Conference Report No. 2166, House of Representatives, 
85th Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 199, as a summary of the A c t  estab- 
lishing WSA, and a brief outline of Ithe appaxent intent of the Congress 
i n  this Act .  
While many documents are available concerning the technical aspects 
of astronautics, use has been made i n  this report of a single source: 
Space Handbook: Astronautics and Its Applications, Staff Report of the 
Select Committee on Astronautics and Space BqJloration, 85th Congress, 
2nd Session, 193, as a basic unified reference. 
In addition t o  the roAsA staff, the following sources of detailed in- 
formation on the various areas of interest are suggested. It should be 
emphasized that th i s  l i s t  i s  by no means exhaustive. 
Source Type of Information 
Department of Defense 
1. Director, Defense Research Relations of military research and 
development i n  space technology t o  
the general research and engineer- 
ing program of the Department of 
Defense 
and Engineering 
2. Director, Advanced Research General summary of military space 
ProJects Agency programs and plans 
3. Chairman, Civilian-Military Operation of the C-MLC 
Liaison Committee 
4. Joint Advance Study Group, Future military operations in  space 
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
5. Department of the Army Army plans and interest in space 
activit ies 
60 Department of the Navy 
7. 
0. 
9. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13 
14. 
15 
Dg)artmen-t of the Air Force A i r  Force plans and interest i n  
space activit ies 
Commander, Air Research and 
Development Camnand 
DynaSoar Program 
Commander, Air Force Ballistic 
Missile Division, A i r  Research 
and Development Command 
A i r  Force bal l is t ic  missile and 
space activities; reconnaissance 
satel l i te  prodect WS-l ln  
Director, Development Operations 
Division, Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency 
Requirements for engineering tes t  
and evaluation in space; Army 
bal l is t ic  missile and space 
activit ies 
Commander, Pacific Missile Range Launching faci l i t ies  and operations 
Commander, Atlantic Missile 
Ranae 
Launching faci l i t ies  and operations 
Air Force Special Weapons Center Facilities requirements for nuclear 
rockets 
Naval Research Laboratory Navigation satel l i tes  
Chief of Engineers, Army Corps 
of Engineers 
Value of satel l i te  observations to  
river monitoring 
Department of State 
1. Office of the Special Assistant 
t o  the Secretary for Disarmanent 
and Atomic Energy 
Development of international agree- 
ments on control and operation 
U.S. participations in, and commit- 
ments to, United Nations space 
proceedings 
2. Office of Polit ical  Affairs, 
Bureau of United Nations Affairs 
Denartment of Commerce 
1. Director of Research, United 
States Weather Bureau 
Meteorological satellites; economic 
aspects of weather forecasting 
2. Director, U.S. Coast and 
Geodetic Survey 
Value of satel l i te  observations to  
aerial  mapping and geodetic surveys 
Deaartment of Amiculture 
Value of satel l i te  observations t o  
forest -f i re  monitoring 
Department of the Interior 
1. U.S. Geological survey 
Treasury Department 
1. Headquarters, U.8. Coast Guard 
R-99-1IAsCL 
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Central Intelligence Agency 
1. Assistant Director for Scientific 
Intelligence 
Atomic Energy Commission 
1. Director, b s  Alamos 
Scient i f  i c  Laboratory 
United States Information Agency 
1. Office of Research and Intel- 
ligence 
National Science Foundat ion 
1. Director, National Science 
Foundat ion 
National Academy of Sciences 
1. President, National Academy of 
Sciences 
2. Chairman, United States National 
Committee for the International 
Geophysical Year. 
3. Chairman, Space Sciences Board 
Industry and Other Institutions 
1. Director, Jet  Propulsion Labora- 
Value of satel l i te  observations t o  
geological m y s  
Value of satel l i te  observations t o  
iceberg patrol 
USSR space activities, capabilities, 
plans, and organization 
Use of space vehicles fbr mitor- 
lng nuclear weapon tes ts  i n  space; 
nuclear rockets - Rover program 
Apparent public attitudes toward 
space activit ies 
Possibilities and problems of 
scientific research i n  space; 
avenues for international col- 
laboration i n  space sciences 
Possibilities and problems of 
scientific research i n  space; 
avenues for internationdl col- 
laboration in space science6 
International cooperation in large 
scient i f  i c  enterprises 
Space sciences program 
Status of space technology and prime 
needs for advancement 
2. Executive Vice President, Space Status of space technology and 
Technology Laboratories prime needs for advancement 
3. Manager, Astronautics Division, Atlas ba l l i s t i c  missile and its 
Convair Division of General. 
Dynamics Corporation 
potentidl for space applications 
4. Vice President and General Manager, Titan ba l l i s t i c  missile and its 
Denver Division, The Martin 
Cornpay 
5. Vice President - Missiles, 
Douglas Aircraft Company 
6. General Manager, Missile Division, 
Chrysler Corporation 
7. Vice President and Generd 
Manager, Missiles and Space 
Division, Lnckheed Aircraft 
Corporation 
8. Vice President and General 
Manager, Rocketdyne Division, 
North American Aviation, Inc. 
9. Vice Presidents, Liquid and 
Solid Rocket Divisions, 
Aero j e t  -General Corporation 
10. American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company 
potential for space applications 
Thor ball ist ic missile and i t s  
potential for space applications 
Jupiter ba l l i s t i c  missile and its 
po ten t i a  for space applications 
Reconnaissance satellite project 
W S - l l p  and i ts  potential for  
f b t h e r  space applications 
Large rocket engine status 
Large rocket engine status 
Commercial applications of corn- 
municat ion sat e l l i t  e s 
The Problem 
To ident%Q national obJectivee to be serve4 by a p- ab rmwdI.5- 
space activities, to  suggest the -tude ard scope of the prograa =@red 
t o  at- thase objectlvee, sdl t o  detexrnina the balance of emphiuie to bo 
placed on Various phases of the pmgraat in both the short am3 loape tem 
future. 
The followin& statements are believed to  reflect the cod i t l am iht present- 
l y  exbt as a background against which HA&A is attempting to &evelop d 
carry out the national program of nonaUltary space activities: 
While the military departments have had an intereat in the 
use of the epace environment for several yeare, publlc aab 
governmental acceptance of t h i s  field of research ezd ap- 
plication I6 of very recent ori- ard of qwetiotJeble dapth. 
Indeed, tht acceptance was born In  a sanl-bysterioal rea- 
puna0 to the acca~zpllshn~enta of the WSR in this field- 
not fran the caslviction that this new tropltier presented CI 
m e n g e  BLd an opportunity for useful. and benefiW 
hwmn activity. 
We are berooning hcreaeIn&ly comclaus cb the enormou6 
technical difficulties that face us In t h i s  field. It 18 
apparent that very large sums of money and substantial 
numbers of highly trained research and aevelopapent people 
would be required t o  make maximtpP or even substantial pro- 
gress in the next decade in each pramising area. To 
achieve such progreerr mild r e q w  a &lversiaa of r e m e 6  
in the non-military 
program is warranted or, W e d ,  would be substentially more 
productive tbsn a welJ.-@anned, order4 aad da- qppmach 
to the solufion of the problem that  face us. 
-
O f  Such mkde a6 tO C W t I t u k  a m h  A& mt8 
it is not clear that a crash 
Inputs to the preeently delineated program in 1(A8A have 
cane mainly from the Space Science Board of tb lostiarral 
A- and f’rm our ~VI I  grottge. Much has been ac- 
lished because of tbe Inpetus glven to the progra~~ by
enthusiastic scientists seeking new and exciting iielda 
to  conquer. But the realities of budgetary restr&ctions 
ing of people 8nd activities suggest a mare caqprehenslve 
approach. Tbe sheer magnitude of the impact af space pro- 
grams on the budget malres the space m o r t  a matter of 
public policy which deserves and requires the attention 
4 problems Of md&ioaral b-mt and the how- 
Of tOp fl ight Ilrm-SCi~tfflC 
-2- 
de YatfP4 aa iqcae3+ati=o af e,E mkr3.y pmgrax3 
for the developnent of the devices and faci l i t ies  (booster 
and vehicular aystems, tracking nets, launch and range 
faci l i t ies)  which m u s t  underm eny =-going program is 
proviag to be both expensive and time consuming. Ae a re- 
sult, it has been necessary to  slow down the rrndertalring 
of research In space to such an extent that we face the 
prospect of losing the enthusiasm that m u t  be present if 
progress I s  to be made. 
e. Facil i t ies for  these program, lnc lud lq  launching, track- 
ing, data acquieltion, and R & D facl l l t ies  must be world- 
wide in extent and w l l l  be expensive to build, to maintain 
and operate. A mlnlmun level of research efiort would eeau 
to be requlred to justify the investment in money and 
mamqpmit necessary to provide these faci l i t ies ,  
Die cus sion 
The Department of Defense bas adapted and Is pursUing a course which rew- 
niees space as m e r e l y  one additional environment in vhich to ut i l ize  devices 
and system to accanpllsh one or more mllitasy obJectlves. Fxm~ a rdli- 
standpoint, t h i s  Viewpalnt would seea t0 have merit. Pursued to It8 log&cal 
conclusion, space activities in the Department of Defense VDUld then campeta 
for  money vith other metbods of sccanpllshing military objectives. 
%e HASA has been glven broad responsibility for research, developnent, and 
exploration in aeronautice and space. Reserved t o  the DCD are tilaom Sctiri- 
ties which are "peculiar to or primarur aesociated with tha developemt ob 
weapons systems, mllltary operations, or the defense of ths uhited Staterr 
(lncluaiag the research and developnent necessary to  make effeotivs pmvlsicm 
for the defense of the Unlted States)." The parenthetical clause appaare 
to permit research and develapaent by the Do in almost any area of It8 
choosing, and thus It is probably not feasible to attempt to fix 8 hard and 
fast llne between the research and develqment activities of !USA snd DCD 
In the space fleld, Establishment of "military requircleents" sets a degree 
of urgency that may or nray not be realistic but which strongly affects the 
method of  attack and the rate at which progress i. attempted. 
l%e end objectives of tbs HASA program, much of which w l l l  support U l a r y  
objectives in space, have less popular and Congressional appeal than most 
of the military programs. And get, It apgeamr that a v i m  clvilien pro- 
gram must quickly move to a b w t a r y  level of m than one bllllmr dalhre 
annually. What then le or whe& should be tbe level of ef'fort applied by 
HAsA and what is the rationale t h a t  w l l l  support such a level, whatever It 
may bet 
It seems clear that  we now have enough experience t o  examlne mm adeqyately 
the econcdc, sociological, andpollt ical  aspects of apace activities arrd 
that the probable course of sdentlfic activity c8p be p~1?8 sensibly lffedicted 
thaa VELB the case eighteen mopths ago. Accordbgly, It should be possible 
to develop a ratlonale that could be supported by the Adbninishtlos and the 
Congress a d  on wfrich there could be developed a sound azd vell balanced 
-3- 
program of' non-military space activltles. 
discover a better rnethoa for dehrmhing the relationship of HASA'e e f f o r t s  
to those of DOD than presently exists. 
It should also be possible to 
